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FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE IN INTRASTATE WATER
POLLUTION DISPUTES
Committee for the Consideration of the
Jones Falls Sewage System v. Train,
539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976)
The Fourth Circuit evaded an opportunity to clarify the availability
of federal common law actions to abate interstate water pollution.
Consequently, federal common law actions may still be possible despite
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(FWPCAA of 1972).'
In Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys-
tem v. Train,2 a group of Maryland residents sought to enjoin a Balti-
more sewage plant from adding new customers to its system.8 The
plant was already overloaded, and untreated sewage overflowed into
a tributary of the Chesapeake Bay.4 Appellants neglected to allege that
the pollution had an interstate effect. 5 Because city and state officials
had complied with the requirements of the FWPCAA of 1972, no claim
under the statute was possible;6 the citizens' group therefore based its
request for an injunction on an asserted federal common law right.
The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 7 The Court of
Appeals found jurisdiction to hear the suit, dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and held: Private
citizens have no federal common law right to enjoin intrastate pollution.8
The recent history of federal common law actions to abate water
1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. V 1975).
2. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
3. Id. at 1011 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 1007.
5. Id. at 1009-10. Because they showed that Jones Falls Stream was navigable,
appellants thought it unnecessary to allege an interstate effect. Navigable waters are
covered under the Act. See Supplemental Brief for the Appellants on Rehearing at 36,
Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006
(4th Cir. 1976). Congress intended to define "navigable waters" as broadly as the
Constitution would allow. [1973 Current Developments] 3 ENVIR. Rm,. (BNA) 1240.
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975).
7. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 375 F.
Supp. 1148 (D. Md. 1974) (lack of federal question).
8. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1976).
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 1] FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
pollution is confused. In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,9 the Supreme Court
held that, except in matters governed by the Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.10
Erie therefore ended the era of federal general common law, 11 but
signalled the beginning of a "new federal common law."' 2  This new
federal common law arises from two independent sources-important
national interests implicitly or explicitly recognized by the Constitution,
and federal statutes. 3  Illustrative of the first source is the federal
common law governing issues such as admiralty,' 4 foreign relations,5
9. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
10. Id. at 78. In Erie, the Court based its decision on constitutional grounds. See
Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383,
383-98 (1964). But cf. Clark, State Law in Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipres-
ence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946) (constitutional discussion in
Erie is dictum).
11. 304 U.S. at 78.
12. See Friendly, supra note 10, at 405-22.
13. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938). In this case, decided the same day as Erie, the Court used federal common law
to determine the apportionment of an interstate river between two states. See also
Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 374 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) (Douglas, J.) (since Erie, creation of
federal common law is restricted); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (federal common law implements the Constitution and
federal statutes, and is conditioned by them); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term-Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 12 (1975) (courts
must look to a statute, treaty or the Constitution as authority for creation of substantive
federal law). See generally R. CRAMTON, D. CtuRR, & H. KAY, CONFLICr OF LAWS
CASEs-COMMENITs-QIJESTIONS 929-58 (2d ed. 1975); H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND TiH FEDERAL SYsTEM 756-832 (2d ed. P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D.
Shapiro, & H. Wechsler 1973); C. WRIGHT, HAN DBooK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 60 (3d ed. 1976); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLu.. L.
REv. 489 (1954); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Dis-
cretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797
(1957); Monaghan, supra; Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512
(1969); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77
ARYv. L. REv. 1084 (1964); Note, Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival of
Federal Common Law, 59 HARV. L. REv. 966 (1946); Comment, Federal Common Law
and Article III: A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YALE L.J. 325 (1964).
14. Federal common law is created to effectuate the grant of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction in U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375 (1970); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); Pope & Talbot,
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S.
239 (1942); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac. Co.
v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). See Comment, supra note 13, at 327. But see Currie,
Federalism and Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 158. See
generally Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64
HARv. L. REv. 246 (1950); Note, From Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The
Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1214 (1954).
15. See, e.g., Zschening v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawr view/vol1977/iss1/14
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and disputes between states.' The need for federal rules to protect
federal constitutional interests in these areas outweighs the presumption
in favor of state law.'
Courts interpreting federal statutes may generate federal common
law when it is clear that Congress intended the federal courts to fill
gaps left in the statute.' 8 Although courts have not precisely defined
the conditions in which such federal common law gap-filling is appro-
priate,' 9 relevant circumstances include situations in which questions
of federal rights and duties are involved; 20 the extent to which the
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See generally Edwards, The Erie Doctrine it Foreign
Affairs Cases, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 674 (1967); Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the
Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoLtum. L. REV. 805 (1964); Moore, Federalism and
Foreign Relations, 1964 DuKE L.J. 248.
16. Friendly, supra note 10, at 408 n.119 (Constitution requires the fashioning of
federal common law when the interstate nature of a dispute makes the application of
either state's law inappropriate); Monaghan, supra note 13, at 14 (presumption of the
Constitution is that federal law should be used to settle interstate disputes); Note, The
Federal Common Law, supra note 13 (concept of national sovereignty dictates a
nationwide solution to interstate disputes). See, e.g., Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674
(1965); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951); Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589 (1945), modified, 345 U.S. 981 (1953); Kansas v. Missouri, 322 U.S. 213
(1944); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 'U.S. 92 (1938);
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163
(1930); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). But cf.
C. WRiGHT, supra note 13, § 60 (the use of federal common law to settle interstate dis-
putes is not mandated by the Constitution).
17. See generally Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (federal agents violated fourth amendment rights); Bell v.
Hood, 237 U.S. 678 (1946) (violation of fourth and fifth amendment rights); Hill, The
Lawmaking Power of the Federal Constitution: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLuM.
L. RFv. 1024 (1967); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of
Decision, supra note 13, at 1088-89.
18. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. Rnv. 489,
530 (1954) (federal courts may fill statutory gaps by developing uniform federal
decisional rules); Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of
Decision, supra note 13, at 1090; Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 13, at
1522.
19. When fashioning federal common law, courts should follow, not formulate,
congressional policy by finding evidence in the legislative history or scheme that
demonstrates a congressional judgment that federal law should govern the issue before
the court. Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision,
supra note 13, at 1092; Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 13, at 1522.
20. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (federal substantive law fashioned
to promote the overall statutory purpose); Murphy v. Colonial Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
388 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1967) (federal right to inspect list so that voting privileges
granted by Home Owners Loan Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1970) are mean-
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subject is governed by federal statute(s); 21 the overall purpose of the
statutory scheme;22 and, a jurisdictional grant to the federal courts.2"
ingful); City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Crowley, 393 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Wis. 1975)
(bank has federal common law rights implied by the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933,
12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1970)).
For cases where federal common law has been created to protect the federal
government's "proprietary" interests, see Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959)
(validity of federal officer's defense when charged with a tort in the line of duty);
Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) (interpretation of a clause of crop
insurance contract); American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292
F.2d 640 (9th Cir. 1961) (clause interpretation affecting liability of U.S.).
21. When the policy of the law in a field is dominated by federal statutes, legal
relationships in the field not directly governed by the statutes are deemed governed by
federal law. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942).
An example of this is the comprehensive federal regulation of common carriers
engaged in interstate telephone and telegraph transmission that has resulted in a federal
common law of torts. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920)
(carrier's liability for negligence); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Boegli, 251 U.S. 315
(1920) (carrier's liability for negligence); Postal-Telegraph Cable Co. v. Warren-God-
win Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27 (1919) (validity of contract provision on carrier's negli-
gence liability); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir.
1968) (remedy for tort or breach of contract against carrier); O'Brien v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 113 F.2d 539 (1st Cir. 1940) (carrier's liability to person defamed by
transmission of a libelous message).
22. To advance the overall purpose of a federal statutory scheme, courts have
implied civil remedies for those injured because of a statutory violation by another. See,
e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (federal prohibition on campaign spending, 18
U.S.C. § 610 (1970)); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Securities &
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh (1970)); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241
U.S. 33 (1916) (Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1970)); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch.
601, 52 Stat. 977 (repealed 1958)); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.
1947) (Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970)).
See also Note, Implying Federal Remedies from Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77 HAsv.
L. REv. 285 (1963); Comment, Environmental Protection: A Limited Expansion of the
Citizen's Role, 12 WASHBURN LJ. 54 (1972):
Four prerequisites appear necessary to an implied cause of action: a statutory
policy must be furthered by the right implied; the plaintiff must be within the
class of persons the statute seeks to protect; the right asserted must not be pro-
tected by other remedies; and, the plaintiff's injury must be the result of
another's breach of a statutory duty.
Id. at 59 (footnotes omitted).
23. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (29 U.S.C. §
185(a) (1970) is a "command" to courts to fashion substantive law to answer collective
bargaining problems not covered by statute). See, e.g., Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,
379 U.S. 650 (1965); Local 721, United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers v.
Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964); Atkinson v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238
(1962). See also United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1970) (jurisdic-
tion granted by § 17 of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403-404,
406-409, 411416, 418 (1970)); Deckert v. Independence Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940)
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/14
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When the statute implicitly authorizes it, federal courts develop a
body of federal common law to implement the scheme intended by
Congress.24
The leading case discussing the federal common law of water pollu-
tion is Illinois v. City of Milwaukee,2" in which the Supreme Court found
that Illinois could sue under federal common law to enjoin a public
nuisance originating outside the state, but polluting property within
Illinois. The Court discussed two possible sources for this right with-
out specifying the weight attaching to either. First, the federal in-
terest in controlling water pollution on interstate or navigable waters
required the Court to fill the gaps in federal water pollution statutes. 20
Although the 1965 FWPCA contained no provision granting a state
the right to bring a cause of action, the Court noted that the common
law remedy would complement the policy of the statute.21 If the
Illinois result rested primarily on this statutory justification, the 1972
amendments may have mooted the holding, since the amended Act is
intended to provide comprehensive remedies for water pollution abate-
ment."' In Illinois, the Court recognized that subsequent federal regu-
lations might preempt the federal common law of nuisance; until that
time, however, federal courts were "empowered to appraise the equities
of suits alleging creation of a public nuisance by water pollution.12 9
(jurisdiction granted by § 22(a) of Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1970)); Comment, supra note 13 (jurisdictional grant in the Constitution gives courts
power to create substantive law in admiralty and interstate cases); notes 14 & 16 supra
and accompanying text.
24. The courts' filling of statutory gaps is illustrated by the body of federal common
law that has been fashioned to answer issues in the area of, but not directly answered by,
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 1-60 (1970). See, e.g., Hogue v.
Southern Ry., 390 U.S. 516 (1968) (validity of release under FELA); Dice v. Akron, C.
& Y. Ry., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (jury questions in FELA suit); Brown v. Western Ry. of
Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) (sufficiency of complaints in FELA suits); Ellis v. Union
Pac. R.R., 329 U.S. 649 (1947) (standard of care in FELA case); Jesionowski v. Bos-
ton & M. R.R., 329 U.S. 452 (1947) (res ipsa doctrine in FELA suits); Brady v.
Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476 (1943) (sufficiency of evidence in FELA case).
25. 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
26. Id. at 101-04, 105 n.6.
27. Id. at 104. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970). Illinois was decided under the
FWPCA before the 1972 amendments were enacted. The Court in Illinois referred to
33 U.S.C. § 1160(b), which specifies that state and interstate action to abate pollution is
not displaced by federal enforcement, in determining that Illinois' action was not
precluded by the statute. A similar provision appears in the 1972 amendments, 33
U.S.C. § 1370 (Supp. V 1975).
28. See note 42 infra and accompanying text.
29. 406 U.S. 91, 107 (1972).Washington University Open Scholarship
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The second rationale for the Illinois result was that, even without
a specific jurisdictional grant, the Constitution implicitly requires fed-
eral courts to resolve interstate disputes concerning states' rights in
interstate water pollution cases.30 Even before Erie, courts had de-
veloped "a body of federal common law by which a nuisance in one
state which infringes upon the environmental and ecological rights of
another state may be abated."3 When neither state's law provides
impartial relief, federal common law, accommodating both state and
national interests,32 recognizes a state's cause of action. If the federal
common law in Illinois were derived from the constitutional interest in
federalism, rather than from a federal statute, it would extend only to
parties asserting states' rights in interstate water.33  The Supreme Court
has not stated whether the Illinois common law right arose from this
recognized body of federal common law or from the authority of a
statute which has since been amended. 4
The ambiguity of the Illinois opinion has caused confusion in the
lower courts.3" While one district court held that only sovereigns have
30. Id. at 104-08. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 562 (1963);
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 610 (1945); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98
(1907).
31. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976). See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York City, 283 U.S. 473
(1931) (state can be enjoined from polluting the coastal waters of another state); North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (state enjoined from utilizing a method of
water drainage that adversely affected neighboring state); New York v. New Jersey, 256
U.S. 296 (1921) (state can be enjoined from dumping material into harbor that polluted
waters of neighboring state); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907) (private business enjoined from discharging noxious fumes that polluted air of
neighboring state); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906) (state has right to enjoin
neighboring state's sanitation district from polluting water that flowed into plaintiff
state). See also Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971) (private business
enjoined from dumping chemicals that polluted coastal waters of neighboring state).
32. Monaghan, supra note 13, at 14; 1972 Wis. L. REv. 597. Federal common law
can also provide relief when application of a single state's law is impractical.
33. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. States have "quasi-sovereign" ecolog-
ical rights. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
34. See Comment, Common Law Environmental Liability Under Federal Statutes,
11 F. 778 (1976); Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARv. L.
REV. 1439 (1972); Comment, Federal Common Law in Interstate Water Disputes, 1973
U. ILL. L.F. 141; 77 DIcK. L. REv. 451 (1973); 2 ENVr'L L. REP. 10168 (1972); 10
Hous. L. Rv. 121 (1972); 7 SUFrOLK L. REV. 790 (1973); 1972 WIS. L. REv. 597.
See also Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Administration, 541 F.2d 119, 122-23
(1st Cir. 1976).
35. See, e.g., Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d
1036, 1040 (7th Cir. 1975).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/14
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federal common law rights to abate water pollution,86 another court
allowed any party to seek abatement of pollution of interstate or navi-
gable water based on federal common law.37  A third district court
recognized a state's federal common law right to enjoin a private busi-
ness' intrastate pollution of an interstate body of water;88 the Eighth
Circuit, however, dismissed a similar claim because plaintiff failed to
allege an interstate effect.39 Most courts have sustained the federal
government's federal common law right to abate pollution of navigable
water by private sources.40
This judicial inconsistency may be due to the enactment, since Illinois,
of the FWPCAA of 19721 which creates a comprehensive scheme to
establish and administer water pollution standards. "[A]lthough [the
Act] technically amend[s] the FWPCA of 1965, for all practical pur-
poses [it] replaces all federal water pollution control statutes. 42
36. United States v. Lindsay, 357 F. Supp. 784, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (dicta) (court
denied without prejudice defendant New York City's request to dismiss United States
federal common law claim; court thought rule on the merits inappropriate because
FWPCAA was not fully operational at the time of the suit).
See also Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036,
1039 (7th Cir. 1975) (if pleadings do not allege interests of any sovereign or interstate
parties, jurisdictional questions of the case are not necessarily answered by Illinois).
37. United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'd
mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973).
38. United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D.
Ill. 1973) (FWPCA did not abolish the federal common law of nuisance); see Stream
Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975)
(district courts have jurisdiction over federal common law claim to abate intrastate
pollution of navigable water).
39. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (relief granted on
other grounds) ("Federal nuisance law contemplates, at a minimum, interstate pollution
of air or water.").
40. See, e.g., United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.J. 1973),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 927 (1975); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel
Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Ill. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, 346
F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'd mem., 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973). But see 15
B.C. INDus. & COM. L. Rnv. 795 (1974) (federal government's use of federal common
law is inconsistent with FWPCA and FWPCAA of 1972); 14 B.C. INDus. & CoM. L.
REv. 767 (1973) (federal government should utilize statutory, not common law, reme-
dies).
41. See generally Ipsen & Raisch, Enforcement Under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 9 LAND & WATER L. REv. 369 (1974); McThenia, An
Examination of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 30
WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 195 (1973); Smith, Highlights of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act of 1972, 77 DicK. L. REV. 459 (1973); Comment, The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. Rnv. 672
(1973).
42. McThenia, supra note 41, at 202. But see Comment, supra note 41, at 673 n.6.Washington University Open Scholarship
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Under the FWPCAA of 1972 the federal government sets limits
for pollutant discharges, although states may establish more stringent
standards.4 3 A state has jurisdiction over its own waters and boundary
waters; 44 if a state chooses to enforce its own, and consequently the
federal, standards, it must create a pollution discharge permit system.45
Failure by a state to act promptly to enforce water quality standards
automatically results in federal intervention.46
The FWPCAA of 1972 authorizes private citizen actions in federal
district court to enforce statutory effluent limitations.47 Any citizen 8
may bring an action against any person alleged to have violated the
effluent limitation49 or against the federal administrator for failing to
perform a nondiscretionary act.3 0 Courts may grant injunctions, impose
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(1)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2) (Supp. V 1975).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b) (Supp. V 1975).
46. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (Supp. V 1975).
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975). The statute provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, any citizen may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in vio-
lation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in
controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent stand-
ard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform
such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penal-
ties under section 1319(d) of this title.
Other subsections of § 1365 are concerned with notice (b), venue (c), litigation costs
(d), other citizen rights (e), effluent limitations (f), citizen defined (g), and civil ac-
tions by a state governor (h).
48. Citizen means any person(s) "having an interest which is or might be adversely
affected." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (Supp. V 1975). See S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., reported in A LEGIsLkrIVE HxSTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL Acr
AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 328-29 (1973), reprinted in E1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3776, 3823. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972).
49. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. V 1975) (issuance of a permit under § 1342
is "compliance" with § 1365).
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd in part on other grounds, 97 S. Ct. 965
(1977); Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036 (7th
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss1/14
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civil penalties, 5 or both. The citizen suit provision also has a "saving
clause" which preserves citizens' rights and remedies not granted by
the statute:5" "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person . . . may have under any statute or commop law to seek
enforcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other
relief . ...
The FWPCAA of 1972 also permits private parties to seek judicial
review of an administrative action.54 Application for review must be
made within ninety days of the administrator's contested action.5
Action of the administrator which could have been reviewed, and
was not, is immune from subsequent judicial review."0
Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 396 F. Supp. 1386 (D.D.C.
1975); Sun Enterprises, Ltd. v. Train, 394 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), afj'd, 532 F.2d
280 (1976); Montgomery Environmental Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C.
1973).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) and (d). The citizens' provision of the FWPCAA of 1972
is modeled after the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970)).
One of the primary differences is this authorization, under § 1365, for the courts to
impose civil remedies.
52. It should be noted ... that the section [§ 1365] would specifically preserve
any rights or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown,
other remedies would remain available. Compliance with requirements under
this Act would not be a defense to a common law action for pollution damages.
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reported in A LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE
WATER POLLIrOrN CONTROL AcT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1499
(1973), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 3668, 3746-47.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) has been successfully invoked as maintaining a citizen's right to
bring an enforcement action under other federal jurisdictional statutes, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
1331(a) or 5 U.S.C. § 701-06, besides § 1365. This can be important if the citizen has
lost the right to suit under § 1365(a) because of noncompliance with § 1365(b). See,
e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975);
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1975), vacated, 423
U.S. 809 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 531 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1976).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (Supp. V 1975).
54. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1) (Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd in part on other grounds, 97 S. Ct.
965 (1977); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975);
American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1975); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train,
515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975). See also S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reported
in A LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL Acr AMENDMENTS OF
1972, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 1503 (1973), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 3668, 3750-51.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
Washington University Open Scholarship
FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
In Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys-
tem v. Train,"7 the Fourth Circuit declined to consider whether, in
light of the FWPCAA of 1972, there is currently a federal common
law right of action to abate interstate water pollution. The court
reasoned that federal common law is necessary to resolve interstate
water pollution controversies only when application of either state's
law would be inequitable."8 In this case the court applied Maryland
law because it would not be inequitable: the controversy was local,
required no vindication of a state's rights, and--on plaintiffs allega-
tions-involved no interstate effect." Furthermore, Illinois only recog-
nizes a right to assert a state's rights,10 and therefore does not apply
to private parties."'
Although federal interest in water pollution is apparent, 2 the policy
of the FWPCAA of 1972 is "to recognize, preserve, and protect the
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution . ". . ."  The court suggested that appellants turn
to the state for relief since the saving clause preserved their right to
do so."' Noting that plaintiffs were barred from proceeding under
the FWPCAA of 1972,"5 the Jones court concluded that "it would be
an anomaly to hold that there was a body of federal common law which
proscribes conduct which the 1972 Act of Congress legitimates."6"
The dissent argued for the preservation of earlier federal common law
rights enunciated in Illinois.7  The statute's grant of federal jurisdic-
tion for citizen enforcement combined with the saving clause s suggests
57. 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 1008.
59. Id. at 1010.
60. Id. at 1009 n.8. The court, citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek
Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938), stated that a state need not be a party if the state's rights
are implicated. But see Joint Supplemental Brief for Appellees and Intervenors at 67,
Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006
(4th Cir. 1976) (only sovereigns can seek relief under Illinois).
61. Suits by the United States government might be an exception to this rule, said
the court, but suggested this proposition may be questionable since the enactment of the
FWPCAA of 1972. See 539 F.2d at 1009 n.7. See also note 40 supra and accompany-
ing text.
62. 539 F.2d at 1009.
63. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. I1 1973)).
64. 539 F.2d at 1009 n.9. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (Supp. V 1975).
65. 539 F.2d at 1009. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
66. 539 F.2d at 1009.
67. Id. at 1011.
68. Id. at 1012-13. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) & (e) (Supp. V 1975).
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that Congress intended to retain the federal common law in actions to
abate pollution in navigable waters."' The dissent reasoned that the
federal interest in water pollution is pervasive and is not dependent
on state law."0
The dissent's primary disagreement with the majority, however, lay
in its reading of Illinois. According to the dissent, Illinois does not
limit the common law right to abate public nuisances to suits by state
governments. 71 Rather, it holds that the federal common law may fill
statutory gaps with uniform rules to advance the statute's purpose and
grant relief not included in the statutory remedies.72  The dissent con-
cluded that appellants should amend their complaint to allege an
interstate effect. The district court should then decide on the merits
appellants' right to federal common law relief.73
While the court's holding in Jones is not incorrect, the opinion is
incomplete. The Jones opinion lacks understanding of the federal
common law and avoids the crux of the problem. To assess the validity
of a claim based on federal common law a court must make two de-
terminations: first, it must decide whether either the Constitution or
an act of Congress demonstrates a federal interest in the party's claim;74
and, second, if it finds a federal interest, it must decide whether it is
adequately protected by state law or requires application of federal
common law."5
Rather than analyzing the validity of appellant's claim, the court
dismissed it by distinguishing Jones from Illinois and by assuming that
the Illinois result rested solely on the constitutional interest in preserv-
ing the federal structure. If this interpretation of Illinois is correct,
Illinois provides no support for a private federal common law right of
action to abate water pollution.76 The federalism rationale requires
interstate pollution, the involvement of state rather than private interests,
69. 539 F.2d at 1011.
70. Id. at 1012.
71. Id. at 1014.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1016.
74. Note, The Competence of Federal Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, supra
note 13, at 1099. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
75. Note, supra note 22, at 294; Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 13, at
1522.
76. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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and a finding that application of state law would be either inequitable
or impractical. Jones does not meet these criteria.
On the other hand, the majority did not adequately refute appellant's
contention that Illinois also rested on the theory that courts may
fashion federal common law remedies to fill the gaps in federal statutes.Y
Instead, the court avoided the issue by relying on plaintiff's failure to
allege pollution of interstate waters.78  The court did acknowledge that
Jones Falls Stream is a tributary of Chesapeake Bay;79 pollution of the
Stream results in pollution of Chesapeake Bay, an interstate body of
water. Consequently, the interstate effect of polluting Jones Falls Stream,
while not alleged, is apparent. In the same way the court avoided the
question, addressed by the dissent, of whether the FWPCAA of 1972
created or preserved federal common law rights of action by private
parties.
To ascertain what common law rights can be derived from the
FWPCAA of 1972 requires a determination whether federal common
law is necessary to fill its gaps. A finding that the statutory scheme
would be frustrated or that the federal interest would not be protected by
state law would justify the creation of federal common law.80 Here,
appellant was asking a federal court to develop a federal common law
rule that would require the abatement of pollution permitted by the
FWPCAA of 1972.1 The statute creates two private rights of action:
one, a citizen suit provision for enforcement of effluent standards; s and,
two, a provision for judicial review of administrative decisions.8 3 Other
than these explicit exceptions, Congress did not intend citizens to
litigate water pollution control disputes under federal law. 4 Citizen
suits are part of the enforcement system created by the FWPCAA of
77. Supplemental Brief for Appellants on Rehearing at 18, Committee for the
Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir. 1976).
78. Committee for the Consideration of the Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Train, 539
F.2d 1006, 1010 (4th Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 1007.
80. See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text.
81. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975).
83. 33 U.S.C. § 1369 (Supp. V 1975). See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying
text.
84. Congress expressed concern at cluttering the federal courts with citizen suits,
thus it provided certain technical limitations to both provisions providing for citizen
action. See Reath, Pollution-The Right of Private Enforcement in the Courts, 43 PA.
B.A.Q. 238, 242 (1972).
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1972,85 but the legislative history does not indicate that Congress
intended to authorize the federal courts to create a separate system of
standards and enforcement 8 0
Citizens seeking to abate pollution not enjoinable under the FWPCAA
of 1972 may litigate their complaints under state law. The FWPCAA
of 1972 provides for such citizen suits by permitting states to impose
more stringent standards, s7 and by preserving common law rights to
seek relief under state law."' Congress' failure to preempt state law,
however, does not support the Jones plaintiff's argument that the door
is therefore open to federal common law. Neither the legislative history
nor the administrative scheme of the FWPCAA of 1972 support this
contention.8 9 By carefully defining the role of both federal and state
governments in the administration of the FWPCAA of 1972, the filling
of any statutory gaps is left to state law.00
85. See notes 47 & 54 supra and accompanying text.
86. Section 505 [§ 1365] would not substitute a 'common law' or court devel-
oped definition of water quality. An alleged violation of an effluent control
limitation or standard, would not require reanalysis of technological in [sic]
other considerations at the enforcement stage. These matters will have been
settled in the administrative procedure leading to the establishment of such an
effluent control provision.
S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reported in A LEGIsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENMmENTS OF 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1497 (1973),
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3745.
See Zener, Water Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVMONMENTAL LAv 790 (E.
Dolgin & T. Guilbert ed. 1974).
87. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
88. See notes 52 & 53 supra and accompanying text.
89. The legislative history demonstrates that the regulatory scheme was deliberately
designed to provide for citizen participation in the FWPCAA of 1972. Congress sought
to accomplish this by providing for: (1) public participation in the development of
effluent standards, § 1251(a), (2) making permit applications and permits issued under
§ 1342 public records, § 1342(j), (3) federal enforcement, § 1319, (4) judicial review
of Administrator's actions, § 1369(b), and, (5) the citizen suit provision for enforce-
ment actions, § 1365. H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1972), reported in
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 753, 819 (1973). See Proposed Amendments to the Water
Pollution Control Act: Hearings on H.R. 11,896 Before the House Committee on Public
Works, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reported in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLU-
TION CONTROL ACT AmENDMENTS OF 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1111-1251 (1973).
In answer to a question expressing concern about citizens filing suits without
reference to the EPA standards, Russell E. Train, Chairman, Council on Environmental
Quality, responded: "We have felt it very important that citizen's suits be directed to
enforcing standards set by law and regulation rather than hypothetical standards which
are not related to statutory and regulatory enactment, and I think that this is an impor-
tant matter to keep in mind." Id. at 1153.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. V 1975). See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp.,Washington University Open Scholarship
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Citizens' ability to enjoin intrastate water pollution not enjoinable
under the FWPCAA of 1972 is therefore limited to appellate review of
administrative actions0' and to litigation under state law.9 2  It has
been suggested, however, that the rule in Illinois does permit a federal
common law cause of action for a citizen in one state who seeks to abate
pollution in another state."' The pitfalls of Jones might have been
avoided had a citizen of another state brought suit alleging that the
pollution of Jones Falls Stream created a nuisance in his state. Such
a suit would have raised the larger constitutional and statutory questions
discussed, but not clearly decided, in Illinois.
In holding that there is no body of federal common law that confers
rights upon private citizens to enjoin intrastate pollution not enjoin-
able under the FWPCAA of 1972, the Fourth Circuit found that this
statute expresses the extent of federal interest in intrastate pollution.
The more important question concerning interstate actions remains
unanswered.
401 U.S. 493 (1971); Boger, The Common Law of Public Nuisance in State Environ-
mental Litigation, 4 ENVT'L AFF. 367, 367 (1975).
91. In Jones the appellees alleged that the appellants failed to exercise these rights.
See Joint Supplemental Brief for the Appellees and the Intervenor Appellees at 16-17.
But the appellants claimed they were misled by the state into believing that the permit
in question was only a temporary permit, and therefore they did not challenge it within
90 days after its issuance. See Reply Brief for the Appellants at 1-2.
92. See generally Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 WIs. L. REv.
738; Maloney, Judicial Protection of The Environment: A New Role for Common-Law
Remedies, 25 VAND. L. RE". 145 (1972); Trumbull, Private Environmental Legal Action,
7 U.S.F.L. Rv. 27 (1972) (Michigan's new laws concerning citizen environmental
rights); Note, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 734 (1970)
(civil remedies for violation of state regulations).
93. 77 Die. L. REv. 451, 456-58 (1973); 2 ENVT'L L. REv. 10,168, 10,172 (1972).
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